Introduction The devastation and havoc brought by World War II forced politicians

Introduction
The devastation and havoc brought by World War II forced politicians, thinkers and humanists to think seriously about the means that should be adopted in the relations among the nations that could significantly reduce the likelihood of conflict and war, and establish a more durable long lasting peace. The foundation of nation-state came under attack by many since its extremeness before the War has resulted in the most devastating one in human history, that witnessed the use of the ultimate weapon of mass destruction. the concept of sovereignty came under attack and put the nation-state as the highest point of citizens’ allegiance. Nation-state as the most important centre of analysis in international relations started losing its position because nation-state itself was affected by many transnational phenomena, which it was unable to control. The logical answer was to look beyond the nation-state and shift the stress of study from territorial to functional activities so that a kind of integration among the hitherto sovereign nation-state could be achieved. This theoretical base was provided most notably by the functionalists and its critics who propounded a modified version of it.

Functionalists
Although his state-favoring result, Leonard Woolf gave some decent Works on economic and technical cooperation among nations. He accepted the state dominated structure but at the same time, he rejected the isolationalist ideas that reflect pure realist intentions. (Woolf, 1916) Woolf started the idea flow through functionalist theory in his mixture of workings. The main body was constructed by David Mitrany, a soul which accepted as the main contributor and forefather of functionalist assumptions.

His main thesis concentrated on integrating some low parts of states together and strengthen the binds between nations onwards. These integrative activities will take place on economic, social and cultural affairs. Mitrany argues in his work on The Functional Approach to World Organization 1948 demonstrated the idea of functional cooperation, supranational and autonomous bodies which constitutes a body that provides a sovereignty pool between states for joint action in that area of conduction. Those bodies were especially economic and social to elevate communal and efficient understanding between nations while giving enough respect to political grounds to evade misunderstandings. For Mitrany, this kind of functional integration will tear down the traditional link between authority and a definite territory
Evaluation of Functionalism
The two major premises of functionalism and the process of integration have been severely criticized by the scholars. They have expressed doubt whether loyalties of people could be shifted simply because welfare work is being done by the international agencies. That international institutions are capable of being the focus of individual’s loyalties, was very much in doubt. Secondly, the capability of educating the governments was also questioned. It was argued that no government would like and would be ready to lose control over their interests. it is argued that functionalism is anti-politics. J.P. Swell notes, the functionalist antipathy towards politics is evidenced not only by disparaging comments and the lack of any sustained discussion of the political but also a certain amount of ambiguity when the term is employed.
The most critically attacked was the functionalist premise that the economic, social and welfare function can be separated from the political ones and many thinkers argued that economic welfare itself was an issue of high politics. Myrdal argues that objectives like an equal distribution of income cannot be achieved by functional method. the circular and rhythmic method of integration was attacked because, it was argued, that Mitrany failed to take into account the uncertainty, turbulence and violence in international politics. Claude has remarked, “functionalism cannot guarantee that one thing leads inexorably and interminably to another in international relations”. Claude, in fact, is a staunch critic of functionalism and has concluded “there is a room for doubt that functionalists have found the key which infallibly opens the doors that keep human loyalties piled up in sovereign warehouses, thereby permitting those loyalties to spill over into the receptacles of internationalism. In defence of functionalism which had immense appeal at the popular level, it can be argued that most of the critics were invariably very unsympathetic towards it. It is true that the total shift in the popular loyalty has not taken place but the softening and opening up of attitudes towards each other has taken place among the states operating in international agencies. The governments have also learned in living with international organizations and sacrificing a bit, a slice of sovereignty in this age of interdependence.
Communication Approach to Integration
This approach leans on the fundamental premises of cybernetics – the science of control and communication system. It assumes that social process follows the laws of cybernetics hence it affects the interactions of nation- states too. Using this basic premise, Karl Deutsch thought that the intensive pattern of communication between the states and increasing flow of information among the people would lead to the emergence of security communities. The key to develop this pattern of interaction among the groups, people and governments was thought as the balancing act of loads and capabilities in the system. Like Mitrany, his major concern was also to establish security communities where wars became less probable and peace more durable. In his search for essential conditions to create such security communities, Karl Deutsch identifies nine such essential conditions. These are: (1) mutual compatibility of main values; (2) a distinctive way of life; (3) expectations of stronger economic ties and gains; (4) a marked increase in political and administrative capabilities of at least some participating units. (5) superior economic growth on the part of at least some participating units; (6) unbroken links of social communication; (7) a broadening of the political elites; (8) mobility of persons, at least among the politically relative strata; (9) a multiplicity of ranges of communication and transactions.

The concept of political communication and the approach to international integration both have been criticized severely. As a concept, the use and adoptability of a mathematical and technical concept to the field of human behaviour was doubted by many. As an approach to international integration the over emphasis on transactions among people and capabilities of the system was criticized. Chief criticism was by E. Haas who termed this theory as retroactive. He argues the approach does not tell us the content of the message and their imputed relationship to the evolution of capacity as the part of regional institutions. It does not explain when and how trust and responsiveness among actors, elites as well as masses, are to occur. Who are, or what is, to handle the load? however, the approach remains one of the key approach to integration, having many things in common with the functional approach, most important being the emphasis on the flow of the information and people to people contacts.

Neo-Functionalism
Where functionalism was the approach, the theory and the method advocated by the leaders of the movement of European unity, neo-functionalism, was a set of doctrine and hypotheses mainly developed by American political theorists and political scientists of the behavioural system theory tradition. The theory of neo-functionalism, thus, has strong roots in the concept of system theory as advocated by David Easton and in the structural-functional analysis of Gabriel Almond. The neo-functionalists wanted to extend the relevant premises of these theories to the international politics. Thus, Leon Lindberg finds five categories of Almond and Coleman, relevant to the European Community: political socialization, interest articulation, interest aggregation, political communication and decision output.
The second and logically connected link of the theory is the tradition of pluralism and pluralistic thought which is the bedrock, the foundation of neo-functionalism. As Paul Taylor states the neo-functionalists have rejected the Gemeinschaft view of the community which means the rejection of the community based upon individual’s loyalties and cooperation amongst themselves. They have accepted that kind of community which is based on the model of pluralists who advocate the competition, conflict and autonomy of various groups in a society mainly managed by the elites and competing for power in the society. The logical acceptance of the pluralist model was the acceptance of federation which, Haas and Schmitter and most of those working in the European laboratory, became primarily concerned with as the condition for creating new political unions. This end of neo-functionalists makes their theory teleological which means that the whole exercise was made to keep a purpose in view and the purpose was the creation of a supra-national political union of Europe.

Prof. Haas admits that neo-functionalism is consistently, phenomenological which means that the outcome of the process explains the process. Prof. Haas started his work with the examination of the American approach to the European Unity, the methodology and concept of integration. he thoroughly started examining, criticizing, evaluating and refining functionalism of David Mitrany. He visualized a connection between economic cooperation and political integration, to be achieved by the process of automatic-politicization. He rejected the Mitrany’s idea that power is separated from welfare, power is merely a convenient term for describing violence-laden means used for the realization of welfare aims. The functionalist doctrine that economic functions are separated from the political functions was also rejected. Prof Haas modified Mitarny’s assumption that through the process of learning, power oriented governmental actions are transferred into welfare-oriented actions. He opined that, learning is based on the perception of self-interests displayed by the actors. Hence, the learning would be maximized through the maximization of national self-interests. Since, this proposition of functionalists is wrong, according to Haas, their corollary proposition that learning process in one organization would automatically lead to the learning process in others is also wrong.
Prof Haas also rejected Mitrany’s idea that this learning process is maximized through voluntary and technical groups. He advocated that the smaller and homogeneous groups are more important for the integration. He focused his attention on the elites and group-psychology which would shift their loyalties from national to the community centre, contrary to Mitrany’s appeal to the popular- psychology. Finally, he disagreed with Mitrany’s view that when international functional organizations take some of the functions of nation-states, there would be a gradual shift in the political loyalties of people to these organizations. He states that the existence of multiple political loyalties is a simple empirical fact, thus creating a rational political system.
The integration which was defined by Haas as the process was sought to be achieved by shifting the loyalties by elites, groups and political parties, since policies of integration are in the first instance, advanced or blocked by the activities of political parties and their ministers. The shift in the loyalties from the economic groups to the political groups was supposed to be achieved through the process of automatic-politicization or the spill-over. The concept of automatic-politicization remains Neo-functionalists, therefore, lay great emphasis on the institutional settings and the decision-making process because integration is successful only when the common or community institutions increase their authority and legitimacy. This was supposed to be achieved by shifting decision-making from national units to the community’s institutions.

Evaluation of Neo-functionalism
The overwhelming emphasis of neo-functionalists on Europe as a laboratory for integration makes their theory both Euro- centric and teleological. Paul Taylor states that the neo- functionalist’s acceptance of the pluralist model of society fits easily with the federalist’s belief that a unified Europe could provide a political solution. Haas and his associates later on tried to correct the excessive Euro-centric approach and with the help of twelve weighted variables with maximum points attached to each, tried to construct a model with basic building blocks, that could suit the other regions on well. But such a geometrical model cannot be applied with same building blocks in developing regions because, the lack of sufficient knowledge of basic regional pattern in most areas of the world, the emphasis on operationalization and qualification risks distortions and premature conclusions. Pentland observed tha this is the level of analysis in which neo- functionalists seem to have made the least progress.
The basic premise in the process of spill-over was that the continuum between the economic and political actors would lead to the integration from one sector to another like one ripple in a pond leads to the another. But, this is a historical status-quo argument which fails to take evolutionary forces working in each society into account. Haas was forced to admit that these theories of integration, including neo- functionalism was pre-theories because, they do not now provide an explanation for a recurring series of events made up of dimensions of activity causally linked to one another. This causal approach that the neo-functionalists adopted by 1970 when they started treating integration both as a process and the outcome, was termed as new neo-functionalism by Kaiser.
THEORETICAL APPROACHES ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
Where internationalists see democratic representation, some critics see decision-making behind closed doors by an international elite. Others see the process of negotiation leading up to the creation of IOs and the modification of their rules as an exercise in the finding of lowest common denominators that often please no one. Universalists see negotiations among states as favoring existing national elites, and as freezing out the institutions of international civil society, such as NGOs.

Universalism
Universalists argue that it is only through the direct representation of global civil society that international relations can become more democratic. As such, any effort to improve direct representation by separating IOs from direct control by member states is a positive development. At present, the two most common ways of ensuring that this happens are increasing the autonomy of IOs and increasing NGO participation in them. But both independent IO decision-making and NGO participation can also be criticized as antidemocratic. Non-governmental organizations may well be expressions of global civil society, but they are not elected, and they represent the interests
of their members, not of the population at large. Critics of NGO participation in IOs also point out that NGO membership is disproportionately biased toward middle-class, white citizens of Western states. In this sense, NGOs can be criticized as being neocolonial, as a mechanism for reintroducing rule by the West over the South through nonmilitary means.30 Independent IO decision-making can similarly be criticized as being neocolonial, because the secretariats of IOs tend to be made up of professionals, people trained in Western techniques for managing their issue-areas.31 Even if they are acting from the best of intentions, they may focus on what they think they should do rather than what the population at large wants them to do.

Realism
There is a tendency to see the realist tradition as amoral, as simply a practical acceptance of the reality of power politics. But there is a democratic argument to be made for retaining state autonomy in matters of decision-making. Allowing nation states to make their own rules allows different cultures to govern themselves as they see fit. Autonomy also fosters competition among states for better governance. Under the heading of the realist tradition here could be included nationalists, both cultural and economic, who feel that the role of the state is to represent the interests of its citizens and of its culture. If the state defers to a global good while other states pursue their own interests, then the state, and its citizens, lose. There are three key empirical arguments against this realist perspective on the morality and democratic legitimacy of power politics. The first is that because of power disparities among states, only the interests of those who happen to live in powerful states determine international outcomes.
The second is that as the issues facing states are increasingly global in nature, global rather than national solutions are needed. Attempts to deal with issues such as climate change, air traffic control, or the international financial architecture through purely national policy are futile. The third argument against the realist perspective that state decision-making autonomy is preferable to collective decision-making is that competition among states can do much more harm than good. Competition can lead to stable balances of power, and it can lead to policy innovation. But it can also lead to hostility and war, in a way that multilateral or universalist cooperation are unlikely to.

Institutional Approaches
Many of the earliest studies of IOs fit into a category that has been called formal institutional analysis. This approach looks at the formal structure, organization, and bureaucratic hierarchy of IOs. The starting point for this sort of analysis is the organization’s charter, which is in turn usually the text of an international treaty. The charter specifies when and why an IO will come into being, what it is called, and which countries or other actors can be members. It also specifies what the bureaucratic structure of the organization will be, and what powers it will have. It often discusses decision-making procedures within the organization, and its voting structure. Finally, it indicates how the organization will be financed, often provides a process for countries to leave the IO, and sometimes, though infrequently, provides a mechanism for the organization to be terminated once its function has been fulfilled. Understanding the bureaucratic structure of an IO is similarly important in understanding what the organization can and cannot do. This involves looking at
the size, composition, and components of the structure of a given organization.

When looking at the composition of an IO’s bureaucracy, a key distinction to keep in mind is the difference between administrative employees and political appointees. Administrative employees work for the organization itself, and their primary loyalty is presumably to the organization and its goals. Political appointees work with the IO, but work for their home governments, with which their primary loyalty is supposed to lie.
The relative balance of power between these two groups, however, can vary from organization to organization. An organization with a strong secretariat can influence policy-making, whereas when the secretariat is relatively weak member states can end up micro-managing implementation.
Beyond the strictly administrative functions of the secretariat, IOs can have bodies that deal with scientific research, technical standards, adjudicating disputes, and interactions with member countries. These bodies can be either subsidiary to or separate from the secretariat. Many IOs that deal with environmental issues, for example, have separate scientific bodies. These bodies are tasked with developing programs of research into the relevant environmental phenomena that are separate from the research undertaken by national research communities.
Neoinstitutionalism
Neofunctionalism served to bring politics back into the study of IOs, in a way that classical functionalism or formal institutionalism did not allow for. But it shares one major limitation of its two predecessors. It can address the question of what IOs do, but not of how well they do it. It can look at the place an IO holds on the international agenda, and the way in which it changes that agenda, but it cannot really look at the overall effect that the organization has on world politics. But both formal institutionalism and neofunctionalism are also limited in the extent to which they can capture the politics internal to IOs, and the political powerof IOs. Formal institutionalism looks at how IOs are designed on paper. This is a necessary step in understanding the internal politics of IOs, but not a sufficient step, because organizations do not always function in the way they are designed and laid out. Formal institutionalism can also capture the power resources that IOs are formally given in their constitutional documents, but not those that they develop informally.
Neofunctionalism, meanwhile, recognizes both that IOs have significant agenda-setting power in international politics, and that IOs have some autonomy in deciding how to affect those agendas. But neofunctionalism is nonetheless limited by the assumptions that IOs set agendas to further international governance in the issue-areas that they were designed to deal with, and that they will ultimately act to represent the broader interests of the states that created them.

A response to these limitations is neo-institutionalism, also called sociological institutionalism. Rather than taking as a starting point the structure and purpose of an organization as defined by outside actors, neo-institutionalism looks at the actual organizational dynamics within institutions. It borrows from fields outside of international relations theory, such as the study of bureaucratic politics in political science and the study of institutions in sociology, that look at the way bureaucracies behave and at the effects of these broader patterns of behavior. As applied to IOs, this means looking at bureaucratic and institutional rules and politics within the IOs, rather than at constitutional documents or the demands of the issue-area.
There are two ways to look at an IO’s commitment to its own rules and procedures.The first is as an empowering mechanism. States create IOs to serve a particular purpose, and create their structure to further that purpose. But it is the IOs themselves, once they have been created, that create their own norms and operating procedures over time. To the extent that they are committed to these procedures, and to the extent to which the IO makes a difference in international politics, the creation and maintenance of procedures allows the IO to dictate how things will be
done within its issue-area. When combined with effective claims by IOs to both impartiality-they serve the international community, rather than the interests of particular states and expertise, this functional autonomy allows IOs to operate as independent actors with considerable freedom of action.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
Claude Jr., notes that the idea that a peaceful and stable world order can be maintained without the benefit of a collective security system has been seen by most persons concerned with international organization as a far-fetched ideal. The theory of collective security deals directly with the issue of how to cause peace. It takes cognizance of the fact that military power is a central fact of international politics and is likely to remain the case for some time. Thus, the key to enhancing stability in the world is to manage properly military power. For advocates of collective security, it is institutions that are vital in managing power successfully.
Kingsbury define collective security as an arrangement where each state in the system accepts that security of one of them is a concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to aggression. It is the foundational principle of the League of Nations: namely that member states would take a threat or attack on one member as an assault on all of them.
Kupchan et al defines collective security as, an agreement between states to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability and when necessary, band together to stop aggression. This definition captures three distinct ideas: the purpose or end of stopping aggression; the reliance on legal norms to determine both the meaning of that term and the appropriate response; and the rejection of self-help in favor of collective action.
Thus, collective security rests on the idea of institutionalizing the legal use of force, to reduce reliance of self-help as a rather crude instrument of law enforcement. When these ideas are brought together, the concept of collective security may be further defined as: The concept is primarily directed against the illegal use of force within the group of states forming the collective security system rather than an external threat. This idea is captured in Johnson and Niemeyers definition of collective security as: a system based on the universal obligation of all nations to join forces against an aggressor state as soon as the fact of aggression is determined by established procedure. In such a system, aggression is defined as a wrong in universal terms and an aggressor, as soon as he is identified, stands condemned. Hence, the obligation of all nations to take action against him is conceived as a duty to support right against wrong. It is equally founded upon the practical expectation that a communal solidarity of all nations would from the outset make it clear to every government that aggression does not pay.

Assumptions, Relevance and Limitations of Collective Security Theory
In order to explain the theory of collective security, it would be important to examine its key assumptions, relevance and limitations. Organski, for instance, lists five basic assumptions underlying the theory of collective security. That in an armed conflict, member nation-states will be able to agree on which nation is the aggressor. All member nation-states are equally committed to contain and constrain the aggression, irrespective of its source or origin. All member nation-states have identical freedom of action and ability to join in proceedings against the aggressor. The cumulative power of the cooperating members of the alliance for collective security will be adequate and sufficient to overpower the might of the aggressor. In the light of the threat posed by the collective might of the nations of a collective security coalition, the aggressor nation will modify its policies, or if unwilling to do so, will be defeated.

Claude Jr. points out that the theory of collective security is less heavily dependent on a set of assumptions about the nature and causes of war and thus claims to be applicable to wider variety of confrontational situations, assuming that not all wars occur from similar type of causes. The first assumption of collective security is simply that wars are likely to occur and that they ought to be prevented. Wars normally represent efforts to settle disputes, or they could be effects of indefinably broad situations of hostility or calculated methods to realize ambitious designs of conquests. Collective security is a specialized instrument of international policy in the sense that, it is not only intended to prevent the arbitrary and aggressive use of force or provide enforcement mechanisms for the whole body of international law but also assumes the centre piece of world order is the restraint of military action rather than the guarantee of respect for all legal obligations. It also assumes that this ideal may be achieved or at least approximated by a reformation of international policy without changing the structure of international system. Thus collective security holds the belief that governments are open to moral appeals against the misuse of force, and therefore have a rationalistic approach to peace. The rational appeal suggested by collective security to potential belligerents is the use of diplomatic, economic, and military sanctions as tools for inducing rational decision to avoid threatened damage to national self-interest.
Collective security fails if either of two assumptions proves invalid: that blame can be confidently assessed for international crises, and that states are rationally calculating enough to behave prudently.
According to Claude Jr., collective security rests on the proposition that war can be prevented by deterrent effect of overwhelming power of states that are too rational to invite certain defeat. In this regard, it is similar to a balance of power system involving defensive alliances.
In requiring assurance of the indivisibility of peace, collective security demands a factual agreement and then it imposes an ideal requirement, and that is, loyalty to the world community. That the system will work if the peoples of the world identify their particular interests so closely with the general interest of mankind that they go beyond just recognizing the interdepence of nations to a feeling of involvement of all nations. The responsibility of participating in a collective security system are too huge to be borne by any nation but people motivated by genuine sympathy for any and all victims of aggression, and loyalty to the values of a global system of law and order. The operation of a collective security system must always be unstable unless there is belief that what is good for world peace is necessarily good for the nation and is deeply engrained in governments and peoples.

Another requirement of collective security is that all states be willing to entrust their destinies to collective security. This implies that confidence is an essential condition of the success of a collective security system, thus states must be prepared to rely upon its effectiveness and impartiality.
On the objective requirements of collective security, it also depends upon meeting a number of basic conditions in the external sphere. The external sphere includes the power, the legal and the organizational situations. Thus the ideal milieu for a collective security system is, firstly, a world characterized by a considerable diffusion of power. This means that the most favorable situation would be one where all states commanded equal resources, and the least favorable, one marked by the concentration of effective power in a few major states. The existence of several great powers of roughly equal strength is essential to collective security.

Secondly, a collective security system demands a substantial universality of membership. Collective security does not, at the outset know probable aggressor and thus assumes that any state may become an aggressor. Thus, collective security is a design for a system of world order. The system is intended to provide security for every state against the particular threat that arouses its sense of national anxiety. The other assumption is that if every potential aggressor, every state which is or might become the source of the misgivings of another state, were excluded, they system will have very few members. Thus, a workable system of collective security cannot afford the exclusion or abstention of a major power.
Limitations of Collective Security Theory
The theory of collective security has certain limitations. According to Morgenthau, the logic of collective security is flawless provided that it can be made to work under the conditions prevailing in the international scene. For collective security to operate as a devise for prevention of war, three assumptions must be fulfilled: 1, the collective system must be able to muster at all times such overwhelming strength against any potential aggressor or coalition of aggressors that the latter would never dare to challenge the order defended by the collective system:2, at least those nations whose combined strength would meet the requirement under (1) must have the same conception of security that they are supposed to defend: 3, those nations must be willing to sub-ordinate their conflicting political interests to the common good defined in terms of the collective defense of all member states. In practice, these three conditions have never been fulfilled thus rendering collective security as being idealistic.

Mearscheimer also criticizes collective security for the following reasons. He argues that theory of collective security is an incomplete theory because it does not provide a satisfactory explanation for how states overcome their fears and learn to trust one another. In other words, it is too ideal. He also argues that it assumes too easily the satisfaction of an extraordinarily complex network of requirements. Mearscheimer argues on the contrary that states have abundant reasons to doubt that collective security will work when aggression seems likely. States that ignore balance of power will perform worse than others. He also argues that collective security has little support from historical record. To him, concerts often emerge in the aftermath of great wars and are merely a matter of classical balance of power which is why they only last as long as the balance of power does not change.
Claude Jr., also points out that collective security is a crafted in such a way that it provides certainty of collective action to frustrate aggression. Thus, a potential victim is reassured and the potential law breaker will get deterrence because the resources of international community will be mobilized against any abuse of national power. This ideal encourages states to hope for collective support in case they are victims of attacks and the aggressive state will receive deterrent action for abusing its national power. Another limitation outlined by Claude Jr., is what he refers to as dilemma of circularity, where collective security cannot work unless policies of states are inspired by confidence in the system, but requires exceptional act of political faith to repose confidence in the system without previous demonstration that collective security works. Collective security theory urges states to assume the application of the notion of self-fulfilling prophecy where if they act as if the collective security system works then it will do so, or else it will fail. The reality is stakes are very high in the world of power politics that states do not lightly undertake such experiment in the field of national security.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is noteworthy to point out that, it is evident it has been difficult to realize a collective security system despite the commitment to the ideal. The commitment to this ideal is a manifestation of yearning for peace and orders as an end rather a belief that the theory of collective security provides a realistic and acceptable means to that end. The world is still very far from the satisfaction of the essential requirements for permitting the operation of a collective security system, and such a system, even if feasible, is in fact a less attractive ideal than it has been thought before. However, despite the difficulty of realizing this ideal, theory of collective security has acquired ideological significance and its basic elements will continue to influence the approach to peace through international organization. Claude, Jr., could not have put it more partly when he notes, the point remains that the theory of collective security has inspired the growing recognition that a war anywhere is a threat to order everywhere, has contributed to the maintenance of the realistic awareness that it is states which are effective components of international society and which are consequently the essential objects of a system aiming at control of international disorder, and has stimulated the rudimentary development of a sense of responsibility to a world community on the part of the reality of global governments and peoples, collective security is a snare as well as a delusion; as a formulation of the reality of global governments and the ideal of global responsibilities, it may be a vital contribution to the evolutionary development of conditions of peace through international organization.

References

Bullock, A., Hitler: Study in Tyranny, (New York: Harper, 1953)
Claude, Jr., I. L., “The Management of Power in the Changing United Nations”, International Organization Vol. 15 (Spring 1961)
Claude Jr., I. L., Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 4th ed., (New York: Random House, 1971)
Claude, Jr., I. L., Collective Security in Europe and Asia, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992)
Danchin, P. G. Things Fall Apart: The Concept of Collective Security in International Law
P. G. Danchin and H. Fisher (eds.) United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
Delbruck, J., “Collective Security” in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, (Oxford: Elswevier, 1992)
Johnson, H. C., and Niemeyer, G., “Collective Security: The Validity of an Ideal,” International Organization, Vol. 8 (1954)
Kennedy, D., “Primitive Legal Scholarship”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 27 (1986)
Koskenniemi, M., From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, (Helsinki: Finish Lawyers Publishing Company, 2005)